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TEETH IN THE TIGER: ORGANIZATIONAL
STANDING AS A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF
FAIR HOUSING ACT ENFORCEMENT
MELISSA ROTHSTEIN AND
MEGAN K. WHYTE DE VASQUEZ*
Since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 Congress
has recognized the need for strong laws that protect the right to
equal treatment and access to goods and services and the pivotal
role that private litigation plays in enforcing these rights. Con-
gress emphasized the critical role of fair housing through the
passage of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, also known as the
Fair Housing Act, in 1968. However, whether due to a lack of
knowledge about their rights and the avenues for relief, un-
awareness that they have been subject to discrimination, fear of
retaliation or distrust in the process, victims of housing discrimi-
nation rarely report these civil rights violations.2 In light of these
barriers to eradicating discrimination and the value to all of so-
ciety in protecting civil rights, Congress recognized that organi-
* Melissa Rothstein is the Deputy Director of the Equal Rights Center and
Megan K. Whyte de Vasquez is the Director of the Fair Housing Project at
the Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. An
earlier version of this Article was published as an Issue Brief by the Ameri-
can Constitution Society in April 2012. That Issue Brief is available at http://
www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/Rothstein-andWhyte--Organizational
Standingl.pdf.
1 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
2 For example, there are an estimated 4 million fair housing violations across
the country each year, only a small fraction of these discriminatory acts being
reported. Modernizing the Fair Housing Act for the 21st Century: 2013 Fair
Housing Trends Report, NAT'L FAIR HOUSING ALLIANCE Apr. 11, 2013, at 16,
http://www.nationalfairhousing.org/Portals/33/2013_FairHousing-Trends
Report.pdf [hereinafter NFHA, TRENDS REPORT].
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zations, not just individuals, are injured by housing
discrimination and other civil rights violations and that they can
recover from these injuries through private enforcement.
Enforcement by civil rights organizations (in the role of "pri-
vate attorneys general") has been critical to ensuring compli-
ance with a host of civil rights laws - and the Fair Housing Act
(FHA) is no exception.3 Of the 25,000 to 30,000 fair housing
complaints filed each year with governmental and private fair
housing organizations, more than two-thirds are investigated by
non-profit organizations.4 Fair housing organizations are able to
efficiently and effectively conduct investigations with little of
the bureaucracy and overhead costs that may be associated with
governmental agencies. Further, they are able to gain the trust
of disenfranchised community members who may not feel com-
fortable lodging a complaint with a government entity. These
organizations remain steadfast in their enforcement and on the
cutting edge of identifying and addressing the changing targets
and modes of discrimination regardless of current political
sentiment.
The Fair Housing Act provides for two avenues of enforce-
ment: an administrative procedure through the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and judicial
proceedings through litigation. Studies increasingly show that
administrative mechanisms are insufficient to "remove the walls
of discrimination,"5 while litigation efforts by private fair hous-
ing organizations have helped bring about significant incremen-
3 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); See also
Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L. REV.
434, 441-44 (2007) (discussing the rise of private enforcement).
4 NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 2, at 17.In 2012, 19,680 fair housing
complaints were filed with private fair housing groups; 6,986 claims and com-
plaints were filed with state and local government agencies, 1,817 claims and
complaints were filed with the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment; and 36 cases were filed by the Department of Justice. Id. Many
of the cases filed with HUD and the local housing agencies also originated
with a private fair housing organization. Id. at 18.
5 114 CONG. REC. 9563 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler).
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tal improvements. Nonetheless, in recent years, courts have
chipped away at organizational standing in a range of civil rights
contexts. Contrary to Congress' intent, some courts have added
requirements beyond those needed under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution.
This Article discusses the importance of organizational stand-
ing with respect to enforcement of the Fair Housing Act. Part I
briefly summarizes relevant provisions of the Fair Housing Act
and the enforcement mechanisms in the law. Part II provides a
history of organizational standing in Fair Housing cases, includ-
ing the recent trend toward erecting new barriers to standing
under civil rights statutes, and explains how such narrow ap-
proaches conflict with the intent and history of the Fair Housing
Act. Part III discusses the practical importance of organizational
standing and describes how the Article III standing require-
ments effectively balance the need for strong enforcement
mechanisms without opening the floodgates to frivolous litiga-
tion. Finally, Part IV recommends that principles underlying the
need for broad standing for FHA enforcement generally be ex-
panded to encompass violations of the affirmatively further fair
housing requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 3608.
I. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
The right to choose where to live is one of the most significant
rights for all adults, impacting employment and education op-
portunities, proximity to family and other resources, and access
to transportation, groceries and other necessities. Title VIII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1968,6 commonly referred to as the Fair
Housing Act, was intended to secure that right for everyone in
the United States. The FHA required sellers, real estate agents,
landlords and property managers to treat all prospective buyers
6 Pub. L . No. 100-430 (codified as amended at 42 USC §§ 3601-3619, 3631
(1988).
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and tenants equally.7 Initially passed to combat segregation and
address overt discrimination against African American renters
and homebuyers,8 the FHA protects against discrimination in
the sale, rental or financing of dwellings. 9 It also protects against
discrimination in the provision of brokerage services in connec-
tion with the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, relig-
ion, sex or national origin.'o Recognizing that the federal
government and local entities had perpetuated segregated living
patterns and housing discrimination," Congress also required
federal agencies, and the housing-related programs and activi-
ties that they fund, to operate "in a manner affirmatively to fur-
ther" fair housing.12
7 114 CONG. REC. S3421-22 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen.
Mondale); See NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
8 NFHA, TRENDs REPORT, supra note 2, at 3-4 (discussing the FHA in con-
text of the civil rights movement of the 1960's); Tracey McCartney & Sara
Pratt, The Fair Housing Act: 35 Years of Evolution (2003), available at http://
www.fairhousing.com/include/media/pdf/35years.pdf; see also Jean Eberhart
Dubofsky, Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASH-
BURN L.J. 149 (1969) (legislative assistant to Senator Mondale discussing pas-
sage of the Fair Housing Act of 1968).
9 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606.
10 Id.
11 114 CONG. REC. 2278 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) ("Traditionally
the American Government has been more than neutral on this issue. The
record of the U.S. Government in [the post-WWII era] is one, at best, of
covert collaborator in policies which established the present outrageous and
heartbreaking racial living patterns which lie at the core of the tragedy of the
American city and the alienation of good people from good people because
of the utter irrelevancy of color."); 114 CONG. REC. 2281 (1968) (statement of
Sen. Brooke) ("Today's Federal housing official commonly inveighs against
the evils of ghetto life even as he pushes buttons that ratify their triumph -
even as he ok's public housing sites in the heart of Negro slums, releases
planning and urban renewal funds to cities dead-set against integration, and
approves the financing of suburban subdivisions from which Negroes will be
barred").
12 Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d),(e)(5) (2006); See also Exec. Order
No. 12,892, 59 Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 17, 1994); Exec. Order No. 12,259, 3
C.F.R. 307 (1981).
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The FHA, as passed in 1968, included weak mechanisms to
enforce the law's anti-discrimination provisions - specifically,
sanctionless administrative conciliation and private rights of ac-
tion with only nominal reliefl - and no direct means of enforc-
ing the affirmatively furthering fair housing provision.
Unsurprisingly, these mechanisms did not effectively curb dis-
criminatory acts.14 A study by the U.S. Department of Housing
and Urban Development ("HUD") a decade after the FHA was
enacted found that, when visiting four apartments in a housing
search, 72% of prospective African American tenants and 48%
of prospective African American homebuyers were subject to
discrimination.1 By the late 1980s, members of Congress from
both sides of the aisle recognized that the FHA's enforcement
mechanisms were too weak to meaningfully impact the housing
market. 16 Making matters worse, federal agencies responsible
for enforcement had dismal records: while by 1979 the U.S. De-
partment of Justice ("DOJ") was handling about 30 FHA cases
per year, no such cases were filed in the early years of the Rea-
13 Id. at § 3612(c) (limiting the remedies for private civil enforcement to in-
junctive relief, actual damages, and $1,000 in punitive damages; providing
attorneys' fees only to prevailing plaintiffs who are indigent).
14 Leland B. Ware, New Weapons for an Old Battle: The Enforcement Provi-
sions of the 1988 Amendments to the Fair Housing Act, 7 ADM. L.J. AM. U.
59, 62 (1993).
15 Ronald E. Wienk et al., Measuring Racial Discrimination in American
Housing Markets: The Housing Market Practices Survey, DEP'T OF Hous. &
URBAN DEV. (1979), http://eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED182397.pdf.
16 See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. S10454-5 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Edward Kennedy) (The existing fair housing law is a toothless tiger. It
recognizes a fundamental right; but it fails to provide a meaningful rem-
edy."); 134 CONG. REC. S10467 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen.
Robert Dole) ("In my view a major reason the fair housing law has not been
more effective is that it relies on voluntary conciliation and persuasion. In
other words, a law without its teeth."). See also Trafficante, 409 U.S at 210-11
("HUD has no power of enforcement. So far as federal agencies are con-
cerned only the Attorney General may sue; yet, as noted, he may sue only to
correct 'a pattern or practice' of housing discrimination [which] creates some
limiting factors in his authority. . .. ").
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gan administration and only 17 in 1987.'2 Recognizing the limits
of the FHA's effectiveness, Congress passed the Fair Housing
Amendments Act in 1988 ("the 1988 Amendments")18 "to fulfill
the 'empty promise' of fair housing offered by the Fair Housing
Act."' 9 The 1988 Amendments added two new protected classes:
people with disabilities and families with children.20 Most impor-
tantly for the purposes of this Article, the 1988 Amendments
overhauled the law's enforcement mechanism so that it would
no longer be a "toothless tiger."21
With respect to enforcement, the 1988 Amendments added an
administrative enforcement procedure - in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) - with an administrative
law judge empowered to impose civil penalties of up to $10,000
for a first offense, $25,000 for a second offense within 5 years,
and $50,000 after two or more offenses within the last seven
years.22 Far beyond trying to limit the extent to which judicial
relief was available for fair housing enforcement, some members
of Congress feared that strengthening the administrative enforce
ment provisions could infringe upon the Seventh Amendment
17 James A. Kushner, An Unfinished Agenda: The Federal Fair Housing En-
forcement Effort, 6 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 348 (1988); See also Martin E. Sloan,
Federal Housing Policy and Equal Opportunity, in A SHELTERED CRISIS:
THE STATE OF FAIR HOUSING IN THE EIGHTIES, 133 (1983).
18 Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat.
1619 (1988).
19 WARE, supra note 14, at 82 (citing 134 Cong. Rec. S10,454) (daily ed. Aug.
1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Kennedy)).
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (2006).
21 134 CONG. REC. S10454-5 (Aug. 1, 1988) (statement of Sen. Edward Ken-
nedy); See also Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and
Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1191, 1193
(2011) ("Improving public and private capacity to resolve discrimination
claims was the theory driving Congress's Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988").
22 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (g)(3) (2006).
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right to a jury trial.23 An amendment offered by Representative
Hamilton Fish, which allowed parties to select whether to pro-
ceed administratively or in district court, offered the needed
compromise to get the 1988 Amendments passed.24
The 1988 Amendments also expanded the potential of judicial
enforcement. Congress eased the burden on complainants exer-
cising private rights of action by removing the $1,000 cap on pu-
nitive damages, requiring no exhaustion for judicial review and
authorizing the award of attorneys' fees for all successful plain-
tiffs.25 Finally, Congress expanded DOJ's enforcement power to
include pattern or practice cases as well as "issues of general
public importance,"26 with increased civil penalties available.27
While the protections against discrimination based on disabil-
ity and familial status were urgently needed, these provisions
significantly increased HUD's caseload and further slowed
down an already protracted investigation process, such that
many cases brought administratively are not processed within
the 100 days allotted by statute. 28 Thus, despite a more compre-
hensive administrative enforcement process, judicial relief re-
mained the key means of enforcement, significantly aided by the
1988 Amendments.
23 WARE, supra note 14, at 84-85 (citing Atlas Roofing co. v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 450-55 (1970); Cortis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)).
24 WADE, supra note 14, at 86 (citing 134 CONG. REc. H4677-78).
25 See 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (a), (c) (2006).
26 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (a) (2006).
27 42 U.S.C. § 3614 (d) (2006).
28 42 U.S.C. § 3610 (a)(1)(B)(iv). See also WARE, supra note 14, at 63.
(describing that in Fiscal Year 2012, there were 1,132 "aged" matters that
passed the 100 statutory deadline without an outcome pending before HUD,
and 3,665 aged matters pending before state and local Fair Housing Assis-
tance Programs); NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 2, at 25.
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL STANDING IN FAIR HOUSING CASES
In any lawsuit, including housing discrimination cases, plain-
tiffs must have standing to bring the case. Article III of the Con-
stitution imposes basic limits on who has standing to bring a
lawsuit to ensure that the plaintiff has an actual injury that can
be remedied by judicial action. Often, parties must also meet the
additional requirements of prudential standing, a set of judge-
made limitations on who can bring a lawsuit.29 Where prudential
standing limits apply, three general principles must be met. First,
the plaintiff should raise his own rights, not the rights of some-
one not involved in the litigation. 30 Second, the court should re-
frain from deciding "abstract questions of wide public
significance" or "generalized grievances" that are better ad-
dressed by the President or Congress.31 Third, the plaintiff's
complaint should "fall within 'the zone of interests to be pro-
tected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question.'"32 The Supreme Court has explained that these addi-
tional requirements apply because:
Without such limitations - closely related to Art.
III concerns but essentially matters of judicial self-
governance - the courts would be called upon to
decide abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance even though other governmental institutions
may be more competent to address the questions
and even though judicial intervention may be un-
necessary to protect individual rights.33
29 See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (describing prudential stand-
ing as judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction).
30 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
31 Id. at 499-500.
32 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
33 Warth, 422 U.S. at 500, (quoting Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v.
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11-12 (2004)).
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Nonetheless, prudential standing limits are not applicable in
cases where Congress has designated a private right of action to
parties that may be barred under prudential standing rules or
where "countervailing considerations may outweigh the con-
cerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power." 34
Even before the 1988 Amendments, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized that Congress intended standing in FHA cases to be "as
[broad] as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution" and
not include prudential limitations.35 In light of the limited ad-
ministrative enforcement mechanisms in the original law, the
Court noted that "[i]t is apparent . . . that complaints by private
persons are the primary method of obtaining compliance with
the Act."36 Under this rubric, a wide range of individual and
institutional plaintiffs have been found to have standing under
the Act - including fair housing organizations? municipalities,38
civil rights testers (individuals who pose as prospective custom-
ers to gather information that may be used to determine
whether or not a housing provider is engaged in discrimina-
tion),39 residents of a neighborhood,40 people confronted by dis-
34 Warth, 422 at 500-01.
35 Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (quoting Glad-
stone, Realtors v. Vill. Of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 109 (1979)); See also
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 372 (1982).
36 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 209; see also id. at 211 ("Since HUD has no en-
forcement powers and since the enormity of the task of assuring fair housing
makes the role of the Attorney General in the matter minimal, the main
generating force must be private suits .... ").
37 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 363.
38 Gladstone, Realtors, 441 U.S. 91.
39 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 374.
40 Id.
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criminatory advertising 41 and even housing developers denied
the opportunity to build multi-racial housing.42
Organizations can have first-party standing on their own be-
half or associational standing on behalf of their members.43 To
establish standing on its own behalf, an organization must
demonstrate a "concrete and demonstrable injury to the organi-
zation's activities."44 The injury need not be pecuniary or physi-
cal in nature45 but must be more than a special interest in a
particular matter.46 The Supreme Court has held that fair hous-
ing organizations may establish organizational standing when
they show a diversion of resources and/or a frustration of mis-
sion fairly traceable to the acts of housing providers.47
Even outside of its jurisprudence regarding organizational
standing, the Court has recognized that civil rights violations
cause widespread injuries that confer standing on persons or en-
tities beyond those who were the direct targets of the discrimi-
nation. Thus, organizations whose harm comes from actions
intended to identify, address and remedy discrimination have
been found to have standing in fair housing and other civil rights
contexts.48
41 Ragin v. Harry Macklowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 904 (2nd Cir. 1993);
Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (E.D. Va. 1987); Bell-
wood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521 (7th Cir 1990). But see Wilson v. Glenwood
Intermountain Props., 98 F.3d 590 (10th Cir. 1996); Ricks v. Beta Dev. Co.,
No. 95-15334, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 19743, at *1 (9th Cir, Aug. 1, 1996).
42 Huntington, N.Y. v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
43 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977);
Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. 363.
44 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379; See generally Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 US 555, 560-61 (1992) (requiring a concrete and particularized
injury in fact for Article III standing).
45 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. 429 U.S. 252,
262-63(1977); see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205,
208-10 (1972).
46 See Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 (1976).
47 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379.
48 Id. at 374 (holding that a tester meets the injury requirement for standing,
even though the tester may have approached with expectation of receiving
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A. Why Organizational Standing Matters
Standing matters because housing discrimination continues
across the nation, and the nature of housing discrimination to-
day makes it difficult to detect by individuals. HUD recently
published the results of its fourth testing-based study intended
to "measure the incidence and forms of discrimination exper-
ienced by black, Hispanic, and Asian renters and
homebuyers." 49 Through more than 8,000 tests in 28 metropoli-
tan areas across the country, the study found that housing dis-
crimination remains a national problem, as neither the incidence
nor severity of discrimination was substantially different across
different parts of the country.50
HUD's study also found that housing discrimination has
changed over time, as blatant door-slamming has given way to
less easily detectable discrimination, such as providing informa-
tion about fewer units to African American and Latino
homeseekers than to whites.51 The discrimination most preva-
lent today generally requires more sophisticated investigations
and comparisons of treatment to detect, resulting in HUD con-
cluding that "enforcement strategies should not rely primarily
on individual complaints of suspected discrimination."S2 One of
the study's recommendations is that fair housing groups should
conduct more testing investigations in an effort to "reveal dis-
criminatory practices that would otherwise go unpunished" and
to encourage housing providers to comply with the law for fear
false information, without an intention of purchasing or renting); Evers v.
Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204 (1958) (in challenge to segregated buses, plaintiff
still had standing even though he "may have boarded this particular bus for
the purpose of instituting this litigation").
49 Housing Discrimination Against Racial and Ethnic Minorities 2012: Execu-
tive Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & DEV., June 2013, at 1-2. [hereinafter
HDS 2012].
50 HDS 2012, supra note 49, at 8.
51 Id. at 12.
52 Id. at 13.
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of being tested5 To eradicate housing discrimination and segre-
gation, HUD's study recommends a "multipronged strategy that
includes vigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination protec-
tions along with education . . . neighborhood reinvestment ...
and new incentives to encourage and nurture stable diversity."54
Fair housing organizations play a unique role because they
both take the laboring oar in fair housing investigations and en-
forcement and do much of the education and outreach on fair
housing issues nationwide. This combination enables them to
learn quickly about the changing face of discrimination in the
communities in which they work and redress that discrimination.
They have made a profound impact on fair housing law because
they have been able to file lawsuits on their own behalf and to
recover for their own injuries. Fair housing organizations can
undertake systemic investigations and uncover larger scale dis-
crimination than individuals could, and, as a result, they can
have a broader impact on the market. While many housing
providers want to comply with the law and remedy any discrimi-
nation they or their agents perpetrate, the ability of fair housing
organizations to pursue litigation on their own behalf ensures
that fair housing organizations can shoulder the lion's share of
enforcement with the law, as Congress intended them to do.
For example, for the past decade, the Equal Rights Center
(ERC)55 has investigated multi-family housing units and build-
ings to determine whether they were built in compliance with
the Fair Housing Act's design and construction provisions.56 As
a result of negotiated resolutions and litigation, the ERC has
53 Id.
54 Id. at 14.
55 The Equal Rights Center is a national civil rights organization headquar-
tered in Washington, DC. While it engages in a multifaceted civil rights prac-
tice with the mission of promoting equal opportunity in housing employment,
access to public accommodations, and government services, it is also the pri-
vate fair housing organization responsible for investigating housing discrimi-
nation complaints in the metro DC area.
56 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604 (3)(c), (4) (West 2014).
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ensured that more than 60,000 housing units comply with the
accessibility requirements of the Fair Housing Act. While hous-
ing developers generally want to ensure that their buildings are
accessible to people with disabilities, remediating inaccessible
units can be very expensive. As a result, purely voluntary
remediation on a large-scale would have been unlikely if the
courthouse doors had been closed to the ERC. While the DOJ
also files lawsuits alleging design and construction violations57
fair housing organizations such as the ERC do the bulk of the
investigating and remedying this type of discrimination to en-
sure that housing providers comply with the law and make their
units accessible to people with disabilities.
The ERC has also made a profound difference in ensuring fair
housing for low-income residents in the District of Columbia,
largely as a result of its ability to enforce fair housing laws in
court. The District of Columbia has a robust Human Rights Act,
which prohibits, among other things, discrimination in housing
based on source of income.58 While all legal sources of income
are protected under the law, participants in the Housing Choice
Voucher Program (more commonly known as Section 8) have
been especially targeted for discrimination, despite clear protec-
tions by the D.C. Human Rights Act.59 The ERC has conducted
both systemic and targeted investigations of housing providers
throughout the District and, during the last decade, has success-
fully resolved over 75 source-of-income discrimination matters,
resulting in the opening of 15,000 units to voucher holders in the
D.C. metro area.
B. Jurisprudential Trends
While the 1970s were arguably a 'golden era' for private en-
forcement of civil rights generally, "[t]he private attorney gen-
Volume 7, Number Z
57 NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 2, at 31-32.
58 D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(a) (2009).
59 See also D.C. Code § 2-1402.21(e) (2009).
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eral soon faced a multilevel assault by the courts and
Congress." 60 In 1992, the Supreme Court decided Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife, which held in an environmental law "citi-
zens' suit" that Congress could only grant standing to plaintiffs
who had an injury in fact. 61 In 1996, Congress restricted the abil-
ity of legal services offices that receive federal funding from par-
ticipating in impact litigation.62 In 2001, the Supreme Court
decided Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, which limited the
availability of attorneys' fees in civil rights cases that are re-
solved without a court order.63 Finally, in 2005, Congress limited
class action litigation through legislation called the Class Action
Fairness Act.6 4 Collectively, these measures erected unprece-
dented barriers to enforcing all types of civil rights laws, includ-
ing fair housing laws.
Lujan dramatically impacted standing jurisprudence and not
just in the civil rights context.65 Nonetheless, post-Lujan courts
have continued to uniformly recognize that organizations have
standing to enforce FHA violations. However, the lack of clarity
in organizational standing jurisprudence generally has resulted
in some variation between courts on the type and extent to
which resources need to be diverted in order to establish harm
to the organization. In some cases, a diversion of any resources
60 Michael Waterstone, A New Vision of Public Enforcement, 92 MINN. L.
REV. 434, 443 (2007).
61 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
62 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(d)(5) (2006).
63 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human
Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
64 Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 114 Stat. 4.
65 Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) ("[Tlhe decision ranks among
the most important in history in terms of the sheer number of federal statutes
that it apparently has invalidated.").
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was found sufficient for standing;66 in others, the court required
an expenditure of resources on organizational activities inde-
pendent of litigation costs; 67 and still other courts have chosen a
middle ground in which resources expended on legal efforts
were considered but not decisive. 68
Further complicating matters is the varying case law regarding
standing in other civil rights cases, some of which include dicta
regarding the Fair Housing Act. In a recent Title VII employ-
ment discrimination case, the Supreme Court curtailed standing
to parties within that law's "zone of interest," thus bringing pru-
dential standing limitations back into the discussion. In Thomp-
son v. North American Stainless,69 in which the plaintiff was
fired after the defendant discovered that plaintiff's coworker/fi-
anc6e had filed a sex discrimination complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Court concluded
third party retaliation could violate Title VII and that, as an em-
ployee and an intentional victim of retaliation, Thompson was a
"person aggrieved" within the zone of interest that Title VII
protected. While, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,70 the Court had stated that the FHA's "person aggrieved"
provision eliminated prudential limitations and suggested in dic-
tum that "person aggrieved" was the same in the Title VII con-
text. In Thompson, the Court characterized this dictum as "too
66 See, e.g., Ragin v. MacKlowe Real Estate Co., 6 F.3d 898, 903-05 (2d Cir
1993); Hooker v. Weathers, 990 F.2d 913, 915 (6th Cir. 1993); Village of Bell-
wood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1526 (7th Cir. 1990).
67 See Fair Hous. Council v. Montgomery Newspapers, 141 F.3d 71, 74 (3rd
Cir. 1998); Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Dallas Cnty. Mental Health &
Mental Retardation Ctr. Bd. of Trustees, 19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994); Spann v.
Colonial Vill., Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
68 See Williams v. Poretsky Mgmt., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 493-94 (D.Md.
1996);Saunders v. Gen. Servs. Corp., 659 F.Supp. 1042, 1051-52 (E.D. Va.
1986); see also Dash Douglas, Standing on Shaky Ground Under the Fair
Housing Act, Akron L. Rev. (2001).
69 Thompson v. North Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.Ct. 863, 870 (2011).
70 Trafficante, 409 U.S 205, 209 (1972).
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expansive" and "ill considered," looking instead to the zone of
interest standard in the APA for Title VII standing.71
Given the legislative and judicial history of the FHA and the
FHA Amendments, it is clear that an expansive view of standing
- one that "extend[s] to the full limits of Art. III"72 - is appro-
priate in FHA actions. Regardless, fair housing organizations
are unquestionably within the zone of interest that the FHA
protects. For example, unlike employment discrimination, fair
housing violations have a broader impact, and Congress recog-
nized the interest of organizations and others in having a diverse
community.73 Looking to the APA for guidance as the Thomp-
son Court does, civil rights organizations have successfully
brought APA actions against HUD for failing to affirmatively
further fair housing in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d).74
Notably, the federal agencies with FHA enforcement powers
have consistently recognized the importance and value of pri-
vate enforcement, including through organizational standing.75
71 Thompson, 131 S.Ct. at 870.
72 Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 372.
73 Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 210 n. 10 ("While members of minority groups
were damaged the most from discrimination in housing practices, the propo-
nents of the legislation emphasized that those who were not the direct objects
of discrimination had an interest in ensuring fair housing, as they too suf-
fered." (citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Af-
fai-rs of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S. 1358, S. 2114,
and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).
74 See N.A.A.C.P. v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st
Cir. 1987); See also infra Part IV at 12 (discussing the APA as mechanism to
enforce § 3608) (discussing the APA as a mechanism to enforce § 3608).
75 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plain-
tiff-Appellant and Reversal, Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 633 F.3d 1136
(D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 09-5359), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
app/briefs/equalrightscenter.pdf ; Brief of the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae in Opposition to the District of Columbia's Motion to Dismiss, 2922
Sherman Avenue Tenants' Ass'n v. District of Columbia, Civ. No. 1:00-CV-
00862 (D.D.C. June 12, 2001) (arguing that four tenant associations had
standing to bring claims on their own behalf as well as on behalf of their
members), available at http://www.justice.gov/crtlabout/hce/documents/ami-
cussherman.php; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Volume 7, Number 2
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 19+
Spring zoi-+
16
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol7/iss2/3
195
As Congress recognized when passing the Act, the federal gov-
ernment simply lacks the resources to effectively enforce the
FHA on its own.7 6
Moreover, Congress has recently reiterated its intent to pro-
vide for strong enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, including
that the law's application be "broad and inclusive."7 In a resolu-
tion to honor the 40th anniversary of the Fair Housing Act in
2008, Congress noted that "fair housing education and enforce-
ment play a pivotal role in increasing housing choice and minor-
ity home ownership and combating predatory lending" and
encourages "all people and levels of government to rededicate
themselves to the enforcement and ideals of fair housing
laws."78
III. ARTICLE III STANDING ALLOWS FOR EFFECTIVE
IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING OF
FHA COMPLIANCE
Identifying and addressing housing discrimination requires
ongoing monitoring by entities with appropriate expertise. Mod-
Appellee, Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899 (9th Cir. 2002) (Nos.
00-15925 & 00-17040) (arguing that Fair Housing of Marin had organizational
standing, stating that the United States has "an interest in ensuring the avail-
ability of such private enforcement actions, consistent with the statute and
the Constitution"), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/aboutlapp/briefs/
marin.htm; see also Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil
Rights, Remarks at the National Fair Housing Policy Conference (July 20,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/speeches/perez-fairhousingpol-
icyconf-speech.php ("Last week we filed an amicus brief in the DC Circuit in
ERC v. Post Properties to make clear that fair housing groups who divert
resources to combat discrimination they have discovered do meet Article III
standing to sue. The Justice Department understands the importance of sup-
porting the legal principle that fair housing groups have standing to sue.").
76 In 2012, the Department of Justice filed 36 fair housing cases and 1,817
claims and complaints were filed with HUD only 6% of the complaints or
claims filed that year. NFHA, Trends Report, supra note 2, at 17.
77 H.R. Res. 1095, 110th Cong. (2008).
78 Id.
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ern discriminatory housing practices rarely involve blatant "no
allowed" statements. However, through actions such as of-
fering different rates or terms of lease or sale, steering and mis-
representations of availability, housing discrimination remains
pervasive. Judicial action has been the most effective means of
addressing this societal ailment, primarily through organizations
that have the knowledge and capacity to gather evidence, pro-
pose effective remedies and monitor compliance.
The predominant insidious modes of discrimination make it
nearly impossible for individuals to discern, on their own,
whether they were treated differently because of a protected
characteristic. Rather, the most effective means of identifying
discrimination and the most compelling evidence of discrimina-
tion in enforcement actions are civil rights tests.79 Civil rights
testing is an investigatory tool used by fair housing organizations
and government agencies to identify differences in treatment ac-
corded to home seekers who are similar in every material re-
spect except the variable being tested (e.g., race, color, national
origin, disability). As one court noted, "the evidence provided
by testers is frequently valuable, if not indispensable" to proving
a fair housing violation.80
Fair housing organizations regularly conduct civil rights tests
both to investigate complaints that are lodged by individuals and
to identify discriminatory practices that are less likely to be re-
ported. As discrimination is most commonly endured by mem-
bers of marginalized or disenfranchised communities, the
individuals at the greatest risk are also among those least likely
to report, particularly to a government entity. Moreover, victims
of emerging forms of discrimination - such as people with lim-
ited English proficiency (a proxy for national origin discrimina-
tion) - are less likely to understand that the discrimination they
experienced may be illegal. Thus, discrimination they endure
79 See NHFA, TRENDs REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-7.
80 Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983), See also Hamil-
ton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 910 n.1 (10th Cir. 1973).
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may remain unchecked until an advocacy group identifies and
enforces their rights.
Article III requirements for organizational standing effec-
tively balance the need for strong enforcement mechanisms with
protections against opening the floodgates to frivolous litigation.
The organizational injury required - whether a diversion of re-
sources, a frustration of mission or something else - will inher-
ently involve documenting and/or confirming discrimination
with a higher level of evidentiary support than most individual
complainants can gather, often coupling testing with outreach to
individuals who have been or are at risk of being discriminated
against by the alleged wrongdoer.
Article III standing without prudential limits enables organi-
zations to enforce fair housing laws and to encourage more
proactive remedial action, as well as weed out inappropriate
cases. The ERC and other fair housing organizations' efforts to
secure reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities
illustrate this practice. Reasonable accommodations can take a
variety of forms such as a guide dog or therapy animal in a "no
pets" building or an accessible parking spot in the garage. As
long as there is a nexus between the accommodation and the
person's disability, and providing that the accommodation does
not impose an undue financial or administrative burden, a hous-
ing provider must grant the accommodation. While in many in-
stances a fair housing organization can secure the
accommodation for a resident simply by providing sufficient in-
formation and advocacy informally, refusing to grant a reasona-
ble accommodation is also one of the most powerful ways that
housing providers discriminate against people with disabilities
and effectively refuse to rent to them. Fair housing organizations
and disability advocacy groups are uniquely equipped with the
expertise and resources to counteract dismissive responses by
housing providers and to ensure that enforcement efforts result
in policies and practices that provide equal access for both cur-
rent and prospective tenants.
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Whether due to a discriminatory intent or a more innocuous
resistance to change, housing providers are sometimes reluctant
to modify policies or to invest in the training and supervision
needed to implement fair housing practices. The power of fair
housing organizations to seek enforcement of civil rights laws
without prudential limits on standing encourages housing prov-
iders to remediate discrimination when discovered, avoiding the
likelihood of litigation and additional damages for ongoing
violations.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD SUPPLEMENT THE BROAD STANDING
FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER THE FHA To
INCLUDE A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION FOR FAILING
To AFFIRMATIVELY FURTHER FAIR HOUSING
Maintaining a broad standing requirement for FHA enforce-
ment is an important tool in the fight to end housing discrimina-
tion. However, to foster "truly integrated and balanced living
patterns,"81 organizations and individuals should be granted a
private right of action to address failures to affirmatively further
fair housing.
The FHA requires federal agencies and the housing-related
programs and activities that they fund to operate "in a manner
affirmatively to further fair housing." 82 Regulations implement-
ing this provision specify that local jurisdictions receiving fed-
eral funds must conduct an analysis to identify impediments to
fair housing choice, take appropriate actions to overcome the
impediments identified, and maintain records reflecting the
analysis and actions taken.83
81 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
82 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d), (e)(5) (2006); See also Exec. Order No, 12,892, 59
Fed. Reg. 2939 (Jan. 17, 1994); Exec. Order No 12,259, 3 C.F.R. 307 (1981).
83 24 C.F.R. §§ 91.225, 570.601 (2010); See also U.S. DEP'T Hous. & URBAN
DEV., OFFICE OF FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, FAIR HOUSING
PLANNING GUIDE, VOL. I (1996), available at www.disasterhousing.gov/of-
fices/fheolimages/fhpg.pdf.
Volume 7, Number 2 Spring zo1+
DePaul Journal for Social Justice 198
20
DePaul Journal for Social Justice, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jsj/vol7/iss2/3
Nevertheless, similar to FHA compliance generally before the
1988 Amendments, enforcement of the affirmatively furthering
provision remains ineffectual in practice.84 Some federal pro-
grams not only fail to affirmatively further fair housing but also
exacerbate the problem by creating or maintaining segregated
housing patterns.85 Local governments and public housing au-
thorities continue to develop low income housing in places that
encourage racial segregation and that increase majority-minor-
ity populations in high poverty areas, which in turn negatively
impacts the private housing market and metropolitan communi-
ties as a whole.86
HUD's policing of the use of federal funds to ensure that they
comply with § 3608(e)(5) relies primarily on certifications made
by the federal fund recipient, often resulting in deference to lo-
cal governments and agencies that have been part of the prob-
lem.8 7 A 2010 report from the Government Accountability
Office estimated that 29% of all analyses of impediments are
outdated and that most lack needed and required accountability
measures, such as time frames for implementing recommenda-
tions or the signature of top elected officials.88
The FHA contains no administrative procedure for HUD to
accept a private complaint based on a failure to comply with the
84 Michelle Ghaznavi Collins, Note, Opening Doors to Fair Housing: Enforc-
ing the Affirmatively Further Provision of the Fair Housing Act Through 42
U.S.C. § 1983, 110 COLUm. L. REV. 2135, 2136 (2010); NAT'L COMM. ON FAIR
Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, THE FUTURE OF FAIR HOUSING 37 (2008),
available at http://www.civilrights.org/publications/reports/fairhousing/future
of fair housingjreport.pdf.
85 NAT'L COMM. ON FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, supra note 84 at
37; See also NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
86 COLLINS, supra note 84, at 2147-48.
87 Id. at 2149-50; NAT'L COMM. ON FAIR Hous. & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY,
supra note 84, at 44.
88 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
GRANTS: HUD NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS REQUIREMENTS AND OVERSIGHT
OF JURISDICTIONS' FAIR HOUSING PLANS (2010), available at www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10905.pdf.
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FHA's affirmatively furthering requirement, nor does the law
provide the Department of Justice with authority to enforce this
provision. Private fair housing organizations, which understand
the problems in their communities and know the extent to which
local agencies are trying to fulfill their affirmatively furthering
fair housing obligations, are the best suited to identify and ad-
dress affirmatively furthering violations.
Without any private right of action in the affirmatively fur-
thering provision, fair housing organizations have looked to
three other federal laws to enforce affirmatively furthering vio-
lations: the APA,89 the False Claims Act (FCA) and 42 U.S.C
§ 1983. Using these statutory provisions to enforce fair housing
obligations, however, has presented significant and sometimes
insurmountable barriers.
APA claims are limited to the review of federal agencies' ac-
tions or inactions and therefore provide for no relief directly
against state or local government agencies or public housing au-
thorities. Even when reviewing a federal agency's activities, the
standard of review is highly deferential, generally limited to acts
that are "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law."90 "HUD possesses broad dis-
cretionary powers to develop, award, and administer its grants
and to decide the degree to which they can be shaped to help
achieve Title VIII's goals."91 Even when an abuse of this discre-
tion is found - typically in cases where HUD continues to fund a
housing authority that it knows is maintaining segregated
projects92 - the waiver of sovereign immunity in APA cases is
limited to actions seeking relief other than monetary damages.93
89 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
90 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2006).
91 N.A.A.C.P, Boston Chapter v. HUD, 817 F.2d 149, 158 (1st Cir. 1987).
92 Robert G. Schwemm, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION
§ 21:7 (2010).
93 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
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The FCA also imposes an unduly high evidentiary burden, re-
quiring a private party to establish that the fraud was knowingly
committed94 and to rely on evidence not readily available to the
public. 9 5 The first, and most successful, private suit regarding the
failure to affirmatively further fair housing was brought under
the FCA against Westchester County, New York.96 In that case,
the plaintiff Anti-Discrimination Center of Metropolitan New
York had obtained whistleblower information from County em-
ployees, 97 something rarely available. Enforcing affirmatively
furthering obligations using the FCA is further limited because a
municipality may be liable under the FCA, but FCA claims can-
not be brought against a state.98
On its face, private enforcement actions against local govern-
ments and public housing authorities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do
not appear to pose the same problems as actions brought under
the APA or the FCA. Section 1983 was created to "provide[ ] a
powerful private cause of action, which courts have broadly in-
terpreted as extending to multiple levels of state and local bod-
ies, and conferring a right to a jury trial and attorney fees" as
well as the flexibility to provide monetary, punitive, injunctive
and declarative relief.99 However, recent case law has limited
94 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2006).
95 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2006).
96 United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. West-
chester Cnty., 668 F.Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying summary judg-
ment). The government ultimately intervened and entered a consent decree
with the county, dismissing the FCA claim. Stipulation & Order of Settle-
ment & Dismissal, Westchester County, 688 F. Supp. 2d 548 (No. 06-cv-2860-
DLC), available at http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/settlement-westches-
ter.pdf.
97 False Claims Act Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1 47-49, West-
chester Cnty., 688 F.Supp. 2d 548 (No. 06-cv-2860-DLC), available at http://
www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/WestchesterFCAcomplaint-0.
pdf.
98 Compare Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 784 (2000) with Cook County Ill. v. United States ex rel. Chandler,
538 U.S. 119, 128-29 (2003).
99 CoLLINs, supra note 84, at 2153.
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Section 1983 enforcement to statutory provisions with an
"unambiguously conferred right."00 Whether 42 U.S.C.
§ 3608(e)(5), the affirmatively furthering fair housing provision,
provides such a right is an unresolved question among the
courts. While some have argued that a pragmatic textual analy-
sis supports enforceability under Section 1983,101 courts adopt-
ing a strict textual inquiry have held that Section 3608(e)(5) is
not enforceable through Section 1983.102
Amending the Fair Housing Act to expressly provide a pri-
vate right of action for those aggrieved by a failure to affirma-
tively further fair housing in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5)
- or otherwise altering the language of § 3608(e)(5) to unam-
biguously provide for Section 1983 enforcement - would enable
fair housing organizations to consistently hold local govern-
ments and public housing authorities accountable in their duty
to redress policies and practices that create or maintain the sta-
tus quo of segregated and discriminatory housing.
V. CONCLUSION
While housing discrimination based on race and other pro-
tected characteristics remains unconscionably high, the fair
housing community has made notable strides in improving equal
access to housing. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, be-
tween 1980 and 2000, racial segregation of African Americans
decreased by at least 1% each decade, a "slow, but steady" rate
that was considered substantive.103 This progress can be attrib-
100 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
101 See, e.g., Wallace v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 298 F. Supp. 2d 710, 718 (N.D.
Ill. 2003); Langlois v. Abington Hous. Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D. Mass.
2002); See also COLLINS, supra note 84, at 2175-80.
102 See, e.g., S. Middlesex Opportunity Council, Inc. v. Town of Framingham,
No. 07-12018-DPW, 2008 WL 4595369, at *49-52 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2008);
Thomas v. Butzen, No. 04 C 5555, WL 2387676, at *16-17 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26,
2005).
103 John Iceland, Daniel H. Weinberg & Erika Steinmetz, U.S. CENSUs Bu-
REAU, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION IN THE UNITED
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uted in large part to the availability of private enforcement
mechanisms.10 Even in HUD fair housing investigations where
the FHA allows a party to elect whether to have the case heard
before an administrative law judge or a federal district judge,
the majority of complainants and respondents choose federal
court because of its increased effectiveness.105
Congress has recognized, and more than four decades of case
law has confirmed, that it is only through private enforcement
that the promise of equal housing opportunity for all will be-
come a reality. "There are fewer private fair housing organiza-
tions than federal, state and local government agencies, yet
these private fair housing organizations continue to investigate
nearly twice as many complaints with far less money."1 0 6 With-
out strong avenues for these organizations to enforce FHA vio-
lations, countless acts of discrimination will go unredressed, and
few wrongdoers will be held accountable for their discrimina-
tory practices.
STATES: 1980-2000 72 (2002). See also Margery A. Turner et al., REPORT TO
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, DiSCRIMI-
NATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS: NATIONAL RESULTS FROM
PHASE I HDS 2000 (2002) (finding 22% rate of housing discrimination
against African Americans in 2000, a 4% decrease since 1989).
104 Stephen L. Ross & George C. Galster, Fair Housing Enforcement and
Changes in Discrimination between 1989 and 2000: An Exploratory Study 13
(Univ. of Conn., Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 200516, 2005), available
at http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/econ-wpapers/200516 ("In sum, it ap-
pears that more effective enforcement of fair housing laws does have a mea-
surable impact. Indeed, we therefore conclude that at least part of the
observed general reduction in housing market discrimination against blacks
1989-2000 may be attributed to such enhancements").
105 NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 2, at 22 (showing that between 2005
and 2012, HUD issued 357 charges following investigations in which it was
determined that there was reasonable cause to believe discrimination had
occurred); NFHA, TRENDS REPORT, supra note 2, at 24-25 (illustrating that
during that same period, only 51 matters have resulted in ALJ consent orders
following administrative hearings).
106 Id. at 34.
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